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A bstract 
We present a new approach for handling open normal defaults that 
makes it possible 
1. to derive existentially quantified fo rmulae from ot.her existen-
tially quantified formu lae by default, 
2. to derive universally quantified formulae by default, and 
3. to treat cardinality formulae analogously to other formulae. 
This was not. the case for previous approaches . Reiter uses Skolem-
ization in his treatment of open defaults to achieve the first goal, but 
this has the unpleasant side-effect that logically equivalent. fact.s may 
lead to different default consequences . In addition, Reit.er's approach 
does not comply with our second requi rement. Lifschitz's main moti-
vation for his approach was to satisfy this second demand . However, 
to achieve this goal he has to violate the third req uiremen t, and the 
first condition is also not observed. 
Differing from these two previous approaches, we will not view 
open defaults as schemata for certain instantiated defaults. Instead 
they will be used to define a preference relation on models. But unlike 
the usual approaches to preferential semantics we shall not always take 
the minimal models to construct our semantics. Due to this new treat-
ment of preference relations the resulting nonmonot.onic consequence 
operator has "nice" proof-theoretic properties such as cumulativity. 
. 
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2 
1 Introduction 
In many cases, default information expresses properties of (almost all) indi-
viduals of a given class. Thus "Birds normally can fly" speaks about a default 
property of the class of all birds, and not about the individual bird Tweety. 
On the technical level, in Reiter's Default Logic [11], this means that most 
of the "naturally" occurring defaults are so-called open defaults, i.e., default 
rules with free variables. The standard birds-example is described by the 
rule 
bi'rd( x) : Ily( x) 
fly(x) 
which contains the free variable x. On the other hand, Reiter's definition 
of an extension- which describes the semantics of a default theory- makes 
sense only if considered for closed defaults. 
To bridge this gap, Reiter assumes that open defaults stand for all their 
ground instances. The aim is to apply defaults not only to individuals that 
are explicitly given by ground terms, but also to those implicitly present 
because of the theory. Thereforp., Reiter proposes to Skolemize the world 
description (i.e., the facts one starts with) and the consequents of defaults 
before building ground instances. For example, if we have a default that says 
that doctors normally a1'e 1'ich, and if we know that Torn has a child that is 
a doctor, we should like to conclude that Torn has a rich child, as long as we 
know nothing to the contrary. But to apply the default to Tom's child, we 
need a ground term that stands for this child. This ground term is generated 
by Skolemization. 
Unfortunately, it turns out that the Skolemization step has the very un-
pleasant effect that the consequence::; of a default theory may depend on the 
syntactic form of the world description one starts with (see [1J and Section 2 
below). Another problem of Reiter's treatment of open defaults has been 
pointed out by Lifschitz [8J. If one does not assume that all individuals 
of the universe are named by ground terms, one cannot deduce universally 
quant.ified formulae by default. For example, consider the default without 
prerequisite 
: -,[or-[ree( x) 
-'for-free( x) 
that expresses that, normally, nothing is for free. Together with a world 
description that does not imply the existence of a counterexample, one cannot 
conclude Vx. -'for-free(x), even though -,[or-[ree(t) follows by default for each 
ground term t. 
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To OH'rCOIl1t' t.his problf'lll, Lifschit.z proposes a modification of default 
logic ill which fr('(' variab lf's at'f' 1101. trf'at.p.d as metavariables for ground terms. 
In principle, he considf'rs models of different cardinality separately, and fixes 
t.he universe for a given cardinalit.y. Then he introduces new object constants 
representing all element.s of the universe, and instantiates the defaults with 
t.hese new const.ants. Since the new constants are assumed to represent all 
element.s of the universe, one can now deduce some universally quantified 
formulae by default. However, as we shall show in Section 2, this way of 
proceeding also has some strange effects. In addition, it does not handle 
defaults wit.h prerequisites in the same way as defaults without. From the 
standard birds-default, together with a world description that does not imply 
t.he exist.ence of a counterexample, one still cannot conclude \fx. bird(x) --t 
fly(x) by default. For simi lar reasons, the problem of applying defaults to 
implicit individuals is not solved, i.e., in the doctors-example from above one 
cannot deduce that Tom has a rich child. 
In the present paper we shall propose a new treatment of open defaults 
that tries to avoid the above mentioned problems of previous approaches. 
We shall restrict our attention to normal defaults, i.e., defaults where the 
justification and the consequent are identical. Open normal defaults will not 
be instantiated by ground terms or new object constants, but will be used 
to define a preference relation on the models of the world description. To 
move t.o a "better" (or preferred) model we will sometimes have to change the 
cardinality of the universe of the model, which means that we do not consider 
models of different cardinality separately. Unlike the usual approaches to 
preferential semantics we cannot always take the best models to construct 
our semantics. The reason is that we may get infinite chains of models that 
become better and better. Instead of dismissing such a chain because it 
contains no opt.imal model we will consider something like the limit (i.e., end 
segments) of the chain . 
The definition of this new approach is given in Section 3, and illustrated 
by examples in Section 4. In Section 5 we shall show that the nonmonotonic 
consequence operator we get has "nice" proof-theoretic properties such as 
cumulativity. 
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2 Problems of Reiter's and Lifschitz's Ap-
proaches 
For the conven ience of the reader, we repeat the hasic: ddinit.i ons of Reiter's 
default logic. A default nde is any expression of the form 
0' : /3" ... , f3n 
, 
where 0', (ii, , are first-order formulae. Here 0' is called the prerequisite 
of the rule, /31,' .. , /3n are its fu,stifications, and, is it s consequent. If the 
prerequisite of a default 0' : (31,.'" (in/, is trivially true, i.e., if the universal 
closure of 0' is valid, we often writ.e it as : 131, ... , f3n/" and call it a default 
without prerequisite. A default rule is closed iff 0', 131"", f3n , , do not 
contain free variables. It is nonnal if it has only one just.ification , and if this 
just.ification coin cides with the consequent. 
A default theory is a pair (W, V) where W is a set of closed first-order 
formulae (the world descript.ion) and V is a set of defaul t rules. A default 
theory is closed iff a ll its default rules are closed. 
Intuitively, a closed default rul e can be applied, i.e. , it.s consequent is 
added to the curren t set of beliefs, if its prerequisite is already belie\'ed and its 
justification is consistent with the set of beliefs. Formally, the consequences 
of a closed default theory are defined with reference to the notion of an 
extension, which is a set of closed first-order formulae defined by the following 
fixed point construct ion. 
Definition 2.1 (Reiter extensions) Let (W, V) be a closed default the-
ory. We define an operator' r from sets of closed form ula e to sets of closed 
formulae as follows. For a set F of closed form1tiae} let r(F) be the smallest 
set F' of closed form'ulae satisfying the conditions 
1, W~F'} 
2, F ' is deductively closed} and 
3. for any defa'uli 0' : (31,"" /3n /, E V ) if 0' E F' and .....,(31, . . . , .....,(3n (j. F 
then, E F'. 
Then F is an extension of (W, V) iff F = r( F) . 
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In general, a closed default theory may have more than one extension, or 
even no extension. Depending on whether one wants to employ skeptical or 
credulous reasoning, a closed formula 8 is a consequence of a closed default 
theory iff it is in all extensions or if it is in at least one extension of the theory. 
In the following we shall rest.rict our attention to skeptical reasoning. 
Reiter defines extensions of arbitrary default theories (W, V), i.e., default 
theories with open defaults, as follows. First, the formulae of Wand the 
consequents of the defaults are Skolemized (see [11], Section 7). Second, a 
set V' of closed default rules is generated by taking all ground instances (over 
the initial signature together with the newly introduced Skolem functions) 
of defaults of V (with the consequents in Skolemized form). Now £ is an 
extension of (W, V) iff £ is an extension of the closed default theory (W', V'), 
where W' is the Skolemized form of W. Let us first give an example that 
motivates the Skolemization step. 
Exam pIe 2.2 The world description W consists of the formula :Jx. P( x), 
V consists of the default P(x) : Q(x)jQ(x), and the language contains only 
one constant symbol c and no other function symbols. 
If we do not Skolemize before instantiating the default, there is only one 
instance of the default , and its prerequisite P(c) cannot be deduced. Thus we 
have only one extension, Th(W), and we cannot deduce :Jx. Q(x) by default. 
However, if the world description is Skolemized, we get a new constant b 
and the fact P(b). Now our default can fire for this constant, we can deduce 
Q(b), and thus also :Jx. Q(x), by default. 0 
In the above example, Skolemization is necessary to get the intuitive 
consequence. But in general, the Skolemization step is problematic. The 
next example shows that, due to Skolemization, the consequences of a default 
theory depend on the syntactic form of the world description, i.e., for identical 
sets of open defaults, logically equivalent world descriptions may lead to 
different results. 
Example 2.3 We consider the two world descriptions WI := {:Jx. P(x) 1\ 
Q(x)} and W2 := WI U {:Jx. P(x)}. Obviously, these two sets of formulae 
are logically equivalent. When Skolemizing WI, we get a single new Skolem 
constant b and the fact P(b) 1\ Q(b), whereas when Skolemizing W2 we get 
two Skolem constants c and d, and the facts P(c) 1\ Q(c) and P(d). 
Now consider the (open) default P(x) : -,Q(x)j-,Q(x). For the Skolemized 
version of WI, this default is instantiated with b, whereas for the Skolemized 
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version of W2 it is instantiated with c and d. Obviously, the default rule 
cannot fire for band c, because their being in P and Q is inconsistent with 
its justification. On the other hand, this defaul t rule can be applied to d, 
because being in P is consistent with being in -.Q. For this reason, d is put 
into -.Q , which shows that the Skolemized version of W2 has :lx. -.Q(x) as 
a default consequence, whereas this fact cannot be deduced by default from 
the Skolemized version of WI' 0 
Lifschitz's proposal [8] for a semant ics for open defaults was motivated by 
another problem of Reiter's approach: It is not possible to derive universally 
quantified formulae by defaul t. 
Example 2.4 Assume that we have the single default : Q(x)/Q(x). As 
long as then> is no information to t.he contrary (i.e., one does not know that 
there is an object. that is not in Q) one would like to conclude that all objects 
are in Q. In particular, this means that with the empty world description 
one would like to derive the formula V:c. Q( :r:). 
With Reiter's approach, one can only get Q(t) for all ground terms t. 
Since there i::; no doma,in-clo::;ure a::;::;umption this does not imply tlw de::;ired 
universal formula VX. Q( :I;). 0 
To overcome this problem, Lifschitz does not instantiate defaults by 
ground terms, but by new "parameters," of which he assumes that t.hey 
cover the whole universe, considering models of different card inality sepa-
rately. For a given cardinality, he defines the notion of an extension by a 
fixed point definition, which is a model-theoretic variant of Reiter's proof-
theoretic definit ion. 
More formally, let (W, V) be a (possibly open) default theory, and let 
U be a nonempty set (the universe). Lifschitz extends the language by new 
object constants representing all elements of U. For a set V of models of 
W with universe U , Th*(V) denotes the closed formulae (of the extended 
language) that ar<'~ true in all elements of V. The restriction of T1J*(V) to the 
original language is then denoted by Th(V). 
Definition 2.5 (U-extensions) Let V' be the set of closed defaults (over 
the extended language) that is obtained by instantiating the open defaults of 
V with the new object constants. We define an operator ~ from sets of models 
of W with universe U to sets of models of W with universe U as follows. For 
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a sr:i V of morltl", of vV' with uniruse U. Itt ~ ( V ) be th e largest set V' of 
models of);\..: u'ith uniruse U sotisfying 
• For all defau lts 0 : 31 ..... .3n h E V' . if 0 E Th- (V' ) and ...,.31 ..... ...,3n 
tf. Th- (V ) theTl ~I E Th- (V' ). 
Then Th (V ) is rmU-extwsioTl of (W.V ) i.fJV = ~ (V ). 
Default consequences are then defined in a skeptical way by taking the 
intersect ion of all U-extensions for all nonempty sets U. Obviously, it is 
enough to cons ider one set U for each cardinality. 
In Example 2.4, Lifschitz' s approach yields the formula Vx. Q(x) as a de-
fault consequen ce since the default can be applied for all new constants, and 
it is assumed that these constants cover the whole universe U. If the world de-
scription contains a counterexample-e.g., vV' = {...,Q ( a )}-the approach still 
allows one to get universally quantified formulae as default consequences-
here V~; . (x = (J. V Q( x)). 
Lifschitz shows that for normal defaults without prerequisites there is a 
close connection betweeu the approach presented above and circumscription. 
We shall now argue that for defaults with prerequisites Lifschitz 's approach 
is stil l not totall y satisfactory. 
One problem is tbat in Example 2.2 , where we considered the single de-
fault P(x) : Q(x)/Q( x) and the world description W = {3 x . P( x )} , one still 
cannot conclude 3x. Q( x) by default. The reason is that- because of the 
existential formula- in all models of W with universe U one of the new con-
stants is in P, but for different models this may be the case for different 
constants. This means that we do not get P( c) E Th-(W) for any of the new 
constants, and thus ~(W) = W. 
This argument also shows t.hat one does not get the universal formula 
Vx. P(.7:) -t Q(:c) by default , even though the world description does not 
imply the existence of a counterexample. Thus the treatment of defaults 
witho11t. prerequisites (where Vx. True(x) -t Q(x) is a default consequence 
in the corresponding situation) and of defaults with prerequisites is not sym-
metric. 
Another- sometimes unpleasant- behaviour of this approach comes from 
the fact that different cardinalities are considered separately. The effect is 
that cardinality formulae are treated differently from other formulae. 
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Example 2.6 .\ssume that 'V consists of the (closed ) normal prerequisite-
free default : 3::; d3::; 1' where 3::;1 stands for the formula '\.1'.,1/ .. 1' = ,1/ ex-
pressing t.hat the uni"erse has only 1 element. 
For the empty \\'orld description. Olle might expect that one can conclude 
3~1 by default . This is the case if we use Reiter's approach for closed default 
theories. In fact. 3::;1 ca n consistent I!' be assumed since t here is a model 
(of the empty theory) of cardinalit!· l. Thus the default call be applied. 
Ho\\·e,·er. with Lifschit z's approach the default is not applicable for uniwrses 
U of cardillalit~· greater than 1. and since one takes the intersection of all 
U-extensions. 3::;1 is not concluded by default . 
On the other hand. ifone has a default : 3::;1 Pj:J ::; 1 P. where 3::;IP stands 
for the formula V.I'. y. (P(.I') 1\ P(.II) --+ .1' = .II). then this default would 1)(' 
applied in Libchit z's approach. This shows that the treat111ent of defaults 
concerning the cardinalit.\· oftllf' whole uni\'erse is not symmetric to the treat -
ment of formulae conce1'1ling tllf' cardinality of the extension of predicates in 
the language . 0 
3 A Sell1antics for Open N orlnal Defaults 
The rest.riction to normal defaults is just.ified by the fact that these arc the 
most natural types of default. rules. The main reason for llsing Ilon-Ilormal 
defa ul ts is that they call somet. i mes encode priori t. ies bet \\'een (ot hl'r\\'isl' 
normal) defaults [12]. As point.ed out. by Brewka [..1], it is prderable to t rcat 
priorities direct.ly (see, e.g., [3, G. 2]), and not by an ad hoc encoding. In t hl' 
present paper we do not take priorities bet.weell open default.s int.o account. 
This will be a subject. of furt.her research. 
The aim of t.he modified preferent.ial semantics presented below is to 0\'('1'-
come the problems of previous approaches t.hat. we have point.ed out. aho\'('. 
Thus the new approach should he able to handle default.s wit.h prerequisit.cs 
such that it is possible 
1. to derive exist.entially quant.ified formulae from ot.her exist.ent.ially quan-
tified formulae by default, 
2. to derive universally quantified formulae by default., and 
3. t.o treat. cardinality formulae analogously t.o ot.her formulae . 
As we have seen in the previous section, an approach that instantiates de-
faults by new object constants or ground terms, without Skolemizing exis-
tential quantifiers, is problematic with respect to the first requirement . For 
this reason we will not consider defaults as schemata for certain instantiated 
defaults. Instead they will be used to define a preference relation on the mod-
els of the world description. Intuitively speaking, a model M2 will be better 
than M} with respect to a given default d if M2 contains "less counterexam-
ples" to d than M}. To satisfy the third requirement from above, we cannot 
assume that the models we compare have the same universe. Nevertheless, 
we assume that all universes are subsets of a given class, and that universes 
of different models are not necessarily disjoint. In the following, we are not 
interest.ed in set-theoretic niceties. Thus we shall frequently talk about sets 
of models even though these will most probably only be classes. 
Before we can give a formal definition of the preference relation, we have 
to introduce some notation. An open normal default d = a : (3/(3 will be 
written as a(;!<.): (3(;£)/(3(;£), where the tuple;£ = (x}, ... ,xn ) consists of 
the free variables occurring in a, (3 . Now let ;£ = (x}, ... , x n ) be a tuple of 
variables, and let </J be a formula having some of these variables as its free 
variables . Assume that M is a model with universe UM, and v is a valuation 
that replaces the Xi by the elements Ui of UM . We say that </J( U}, ... , un) 
holds in M iff v( </J) is true in M. 
Definition 3.1 (positive and negative examples) Let (W,1)) be a de-
fault theory, and let d = a(;£) : (3(;£)/(3(;£) E 1) be an open default containing 
n free variables. For a model M of W with universe UM, a tuple 1!. E U'M 
is a positive example for d in M iff a(ll) and (3(ll) both hold in M. It is a 
negative example for d in M iff a(ll) holds in M, b'ut (3(ll) does not hold in 
M. The set of positive examples will be denoted by Pos( d, M) and the set of 
negative examples by Neg( d, M). 
To move t.o a preferred model we require that we do not lose any positive 
example, and that at least one negative example is changed into a positive 
one. However, these two conditions are not sufficient since it could still 
happen that, while changing one negative example into a positive one, we 
introduce a lot of new negative examples, by changing the universe or the 
interpretation of a. This would not capture the intuition behind the notion 
of a preferred model. For this reason we introduce a third condition that 
disallows the introduction of new negative examples. 
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Definition 3.2 (d-preferred models) Let (W, D) be (J, default theory) d be 
a default in D } and M1 } M2 be models of W. We say that M2 is d-preferred 
to Ml (Ml >-d M2) iff the following conditions hold: 
1. Th e set of positive examples for d in Ml is a subset of the set of positive 
examples for d in A12 (i.e., Pos(d, M1 ) ~ Pos(d, M2))' 
2. At least one of the negative examples for d in Ml is a positive example 
for d in M2 (i.e.) Neg(d, Md n Pos(d, M2) =F 0) . 
3. M2 does not contain new negative examples for d (i. e.) Neg( el, M2) ~ 
Neg(d, Md). 
Tlw fact that one m ay first apply a default <iI , then a default <i2 , etc., is 
captured by going from a lllod('1 Ml of W to a d1-pr('ferred model M 2 , from 
there to a d2-prefened model M,3, etc. 
Definition 3.3 (preferred models) Fo'l' a default th f'. ory (W, D) } the prer 
erence relation >- between m.odels of W is defin ed to be the transitive clos'l/,T'e 
of the union of all 1·ela.t ions hi faT' d E D. As 1ls1wl, the T'efiF:;r;i1le clos'UT'e of 
>- is denoted by t. 
In general, this preference relation will not be antisymmetric, and even 
if it is antisymmetric there may be infinitely decreasing chains. Thus there 
may exist models of W that are not above a minimal model, and it may even 
be the case that there are no minimal models. 
The usual treatment of preference relations (see, e.g., [14 , 7]) is to consider 
just t.he minimal models. Thus a chain that does not end in a minimal model 
is completely di sregarded by this kind of semantics, and the non-existence 
of minimal models is treated as an inconsistency. In Section 4 we shall give 
examples that demonstrate that this is not the adequate way to treat our 
preference relation. For this reason we shall define a modified preferential 
semantics that does not disregard infinitely decreasing chains. Instead it 
takes something like their limit by considering all end segments. 
Defini tion 3.4 (dense sets) Let > be a transitive relation on a set S } a.nd 
let ~ denote its refiexive closure. Let A be a s'Ubset of S . 
1. A is >-complete in S iff for' all s E S there exists a E A such that 
s ~ (t. 
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2. A is >-closed in S iff for all a E A and s E S, a > s implies sEA. 
3. A is >-dense in S iff it is both >-compiete and > -closed in S. 
If it is clear from the context we will often omit the prefix>. 
For example, if S is just an infinitely decreasing chain with respect to >, 
then dense sets are exactly the end segments of the chain. 
The role of minimal models in normal preferential semantics is now taken 
over by dense sets. 
Definit ion 3 .5 (modified preferential semant ics) Let (W, V) be a nor-
mal defmdt theory, and let >- be the preference relation on models of W de-
fined by this theory. We say that a closed fonnula rP is a default consequence 
of (W, V) iff there is a >--dense set in the set of all models of W such that 
rP is true in ail elements of this dense set. 
If every model of W lies above some minimal modeP then the set of 
minimal models is dense . Moreover, any dense set must contain all minimal 
models. This shows that in this case our modified preferential semantics 
coincides with the usual approach of taking minimal models. 
The definition of a preferential semantics based on dense sets makes sure 
that the nonmonotonic consequence relation has nice proof-theoretic proper-
ties. For example, one can only deduce contradictory information if W was 
already inconsistent. This and other properties of the consequence relation 
will be considered in Section 5. But before proving these abstract properties 
we shall give concrete examples in the next section. 
4 Examples 
The purpose of this section is to give examples that motivate the way our 
preferential semantics was defined . In particular, they will demonstrate that 
the three requirements stated at the beginning of the previous section are 
met by our approach. In the following, P, Q will always be unary predicate 
symbols, :c, y variable symbols, and b, c constant symbols. 
The first example shows that our approach can be considered as a skep-
tical one: from contradictory defaults we do not draw default conclusions. 
lThis property is called smooth in [7] or stoppered in [10] . 
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Example 4.1 [contradictory defaults] 
defaults: d1 = : P(x)/P(x), d2 = : -,P( :r;)/-, P( x). 
world description: empty. 
The only consequences we get are the classical consequences of the (empty) 
world description, i.e., the valid closed formulae. The reason is that the only 
dense set is the set of all models of W = 0 itself. This is an easy consequence 
of the definition of dense sets and the fact that Ml >- M2 implies M2 >- MI. 
To show this fact. it is enough to prove that Ml >-d1 M2 implies M2 >- Ml (the 
claim follows by symmetry and induction). Thus assume that Ml >-d1 M 2 . 
Ml >-d1 M2 
-,p ~ I -,p 
P 
P 
Ml -<d2 M2 
As illustrat.ed in Figure 1, t.his means that at least one of the negative 
examples for d1 in Ml (i.e., element.s of -,P) is a positive example for ri l in 
M2 (i.e., an element of P). Some of t.he negative examples for d1 in Ml may 
no longer be in the universe of M 2 , but we cannot lose positive examples. In 
addition, the universe of M2 may contain new elements. These new elements 
must not be negative examples for d1 in M 2 , which means that they a ll have 
to be elements of P. 
Now it is easy to see that M2 >-d2 MI' In fact, the elements of -,p are 
positive examples for ri2 in M2 , and the elements of P are negative examples 
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for d2 in M2. One can regain MI from M2 by keeping the positive examples 
for d2 , making some of the negative examples positive for d2 , adding some 
new positive examples for d2 , and discarding some negative examples for d2 . 
Because in M2 the predicate P contains at least one element that was in 
-,p in MI, we can be sure that at least one negative example for d2 in M2 
becomes positive in MI' Thus we have seen that M2 ';-d2 MI, which yields 
M2 ';- MI. 0 
Something very similar happens when the contradictory defaults have a 
prerequisite R( x) that is not trivially true. The next examples considers a 
single contradictory default. 
Example 4.2 [a single contradictory default] 
defaults: d = P(x) : -,P(:c)j-,P(.1:). 
world description: arbitrary. 
Here the consequences of the default theory are again just the classical con-
sequences of the world description, but for another reason. 
Obviously, there cannot be any positive example for d. Thus it is not 
possible to satisfy t.he first condition in the definition of d-preference, which 
means that no model can be d-preferred over another model. This shows 
that, again, the set of all models of the world description is the only dense 
s~. 0 
The next four examples consider a default that says "normally all indi-
viduals are in P" with varying world descriptions. The first of these exam-
ples demonstrates that, as in Lifschitz's approach, one can derive universally 
quantified formulae by default. 
Example 4.3 [universally quantified formulae by default] 
defaults: d = : P(x)jP(.'C). 
world description: empty. 
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A model where all elements of the universe are in P is minimal with respect 
to >-d because it contains no negative examples. In addition, any model 
where -,p is not empty can be modified to a d-preferred model where all 
elements of the universe are in P. Thus the set of minimal models is dense, 
and any dense set must contain all minimal models. Obviously, t.he formula 
Vx. P(x) holds in all minimal models. 0 
If the world description implies that there is a counterexample for the de-
fault, one can no longer derive that all elements are in P. But as in Lifschitz's 
approach one can deduct" t. hat all elements different from the counterexample 
are in P. 
Example 4.4 [at least one counterexample] 
defaults: d = : P (:r;)/P( :I:). 
world description: 3:r:. -,P(:r). 
First, we show that models wlwrf' a ll but one elf'ment of t.Ilf' univf'rsf' are ill 
Pare >-d-minimal model::;. ASSllllW to t.he cOlltrary that M\ is slich a model, 
and that Ml >-d M2 . Let u E UM1 be the only elenwnt of -,p in M1 • Since 
this is the only negative example for d in M1 , it has to be a positive example 
in M 2 . In add it.ion, all the otlwr elements of UM1 are positive examples for d 
in MI. Thus they also have to be positive examples for din M 2. Because M2 
is a model of 3:[:. -,P(.7:), it thus contains a new negative example. This means 
that the third condition in the definition of d-preference is not sat isfied. 
Second, it is easy to see that any model where -,p has more than one 
element can be modified to a d-preferred model with exact ly one element in 
-,P. 
Finally, the formula 
3:1;. (-,P(:r:) 1\ Vy. (x:; Y -t P(y))) 
holds in all minimal models. o 
This example demonstrates why the third condition in the definition of 
d-preference is necessary. Assume that d-preference was defined just using 
the first and the second condit ion. Then one could move from a model having 
exactly one element in -,p to a better one by first putting this one element 
15 
into P. and then augmenting the uniwrse by a new element that is put int o 
-P . It is eas:-' to see that thi" \\'ay one would deduce by default all formulae 
saying that the uni\'erse contains at least n elements (for each cardinality n). 
\\'hile these formulae are no desirable default consequences in the abo\'e 
example. one shou ld like to deduce them (for finite cardinaliti es) in the next 
example . 
Example 4.5 [P becomes infinite by default] 
defaults: d= :P(:r) / P (r). 
world description: For each finitp cardinality n a formula saying that the 
existence of n elements in P implies the existence of n + 1 elements in 
tlw uni\·erse. 
Obviollsly, a model of the world descript ion where all elements of the universe 
are in P must be infinite. Since such a model contains no negative examples, 
it is >-.-t-minimal. In addition, any model in which -,p is not empty can be 
modifipd to an infinite d-prefelTPcl model where -,p is empty. 
All the minimal models satisfy Vx. P(x) and, for all finite cardinalities n, 
all formulae say ing that the llni verse contains at least n elements. 0 
If t he world description implies the ex istence of infinitely many elements 
of -,P, a default that says that normally all elements are in P should allow one 
to derive that P is also infinite. The next example shows that our approach 
sat isfies this requirement. 
Example 4.6 [infinitely many cOllnterexampleJ 
defaults: d = : P( :I;)/P( :r; ). 
world description: For each finite card inality n a formula saying that -,p 
contains at least n elements. 
For all fillit e cardinaliti es n, the formula saying that P has at least n elements 
is a defallit CO li sequence of this theory. To prove this it is enough to show 
that the set of all models of the world description for which P is infinite is a 
dense set . 
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This set. is ('Iosed \)('('al1s(-' whell lllovillg to a d-pI'f'ff'lTf'd model one must 
not losf' posit.ive ('Xcllllpl('s (i.t'., f' 1f'IlWllt.S of Pl. To Sf'f' that it is complete, 
assumf' t.hat. M is a modf'1 of tlw world description t.hat interprets P as a 
finitf'sf't.. By df'nnit.ioll of tlw world df'scription, M contains infinitely many 
negat.iw f'xamp lf's (i.f'. , eJc.llwnt.s of -,P) . Obviously, one can change infinitely 
many of tlleSf' lIf'gat.ivf' f'xrllllplf's to posit.iw onf'S, while still keeping infinitely 
many f'1('mf'lIt.s ill -,P . Tllis shows t.hat one can get from M t.o ad-preferred 
modf'1 t.hat. illlf'rprf't.s P by an infinit.f' ~wt.. 0 
III til(' a.hovf' f'xample, 110 model can bf' minimal with respect to 'rd. In 
fact, any 1Il0df'1 of t.ll(, wor ld df'scription must contain infinitely many negative 
examplf's. 011(' ca ll always c1lallgf' OIl(' of t hf'Sf' t.o a posit.ivf' example , thus 
obt.aillillg a d-prd(,IT{'d lllodf'1. T lli s SIIOWS t.hat. a millimal-model approach 
wou ld 1I0t. 1)(' appropriCit e ill 0111" (,OIlt.('Xt.. 
Tlw II (-'x t. f'X ill llP Ic demonst.ratf'S t.lla.1 our approa.ch is able to deduce ex-
ist.ent.ially QllC1Ii1.ifi('d forll111la(' hy df'fau\t.. 
Example 4.7 [('xist.( 'llt.i,dly qualil.ified formulaf' by c1f'fault.] 
defaults: d = P( .I" ) : Q( .r )/Q(.r). 
world description : 3.r. P( .I"). 
By an argllll]('nt. Vf'ry similar t.o til(' onf' us!'d 111 Examplf' 4.:3 one can show 
that. VT . (P( :I") ---+ Q( .I")) is a COnSf'qlIf'IICf' of this t.1lf'ol'Y. Together with 
3:r:. P( :r) t.llis yi(' lds 3:1" . Q(.I") a.s a default. conSf'quence. 
He('all tllc\'t. wit.h Lifscllit.z's appl'oach t1lf'se COIISf'qUf'llces could not be 
obt.ailwd. 0 
III 1.11(' presell('!' of ,) cOIlIlt.er('xamplf' , f' .g. , if t.hf' world df'scription con-
sist.s of 1.11(' formlll" 3.1'. (1'(.1") 1\ -,Q(:I')) , olle call st.ill df'ducf' an appropriate 
ullivf'rsally qllallt.ifin\ forll1l1\a , lIaIlw\y 
1 1'. (P(.I") 1\ -,q( .t' ) 1\ Vy. (.t' f. Y ---+ (P(y) ---+ Q(y)))). 
But. t.he (' xisl.cllt.ial forll1l1la 3.1". (2(.1") call 110 \ollgf'l' be obt.ained. This is 
l'f'asonahk sillce P ('ollld have just. 0111' elf'Illf'Ilt., which t.hf'n must. be in -,Q . 
Howf'ver, if t.he world descriptioll cont.ains an addit.iona l fOl'mula saying that 
P has mol'(' t.hall Ollf' (-'\('11]('111., w(' agaill gf't. 3.t' . Q(.I"). 
I~ ~ { 
It should be noted that in Example 4.7 one would get the same result if 
the formula 3:r:. P(;c) was replaced by P( b) for a constant b. In particular, 
in the presence of a counterexample, one would not conclude Q(b) because 
b could be this counterexample. This shows that our approach does not 
assume that named individuals (i.e., individuals described by ground terms) 
are more normal than other individuals. This assumption is, however, made 
by approaches that instantiate defaults with ground terms. 
To show that our approach does not treat cardinality formulae differently 
from other types of formulae, we reconsider Example 2.6. 
Example 4.8 ["at most one" by default] 
defaults: d = : 3~d3~1' where 3~1 stands for the formula Vx, Y. x = Y 
expressing that the universe has only 1 element.. 
world description: empty. 
The default d is a closed default. Thus there is only one example, the O-tuple,2 
which is either positive or negat.ive, depending on whether the universe has 
cardinality 1 or greater cardinality. For this reason, any model of cardinality 
1 is d-preferred to any model of cardinality greater than 1, and the models 
of cardinality 1 are incomparable with each other. This shows that 3~1 IS a 
default consequence. o 
Our final example demonstrates that not only information on the cardi-
nality of models can be deduced by default, but also new equalities between 
constants. The reason is that the interpretation of constant or function sym-
bols can be changed when moving to a preferred model. 
Example 4.9 [new equalities by default] 
defaults: : P(:r;)/P( ;c). 
world description: -,P(b) 1\ -,P(c). 
By an argument as in Example 4.4 on can show that the formula 
3x . (-,P(x) 1\ Vy. (x =J Y -t P(y))) 
is a default consequence of this theory. Together with the world description 
this formula implies that b = c. 0 
2The unique function from t.he empt.y set. int.o t.he universe. 
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This consequence seems to be reasonable since band c are counterexam-
ples for the default. To keep the number of counterexamples as small as 
possible, the best one can do is to identify b with c (as long as there is no 
information to the contrary), and thus have only one counterexample instead 
of two. 
5 Proof-Theoretic Properties 
The modified preferential approach we have presented in Section 3 satisfies 
most. of the proof-t.heoretic properties considered by Gabbay [5], Makinson 
[9], and Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [7]. It. should be Hot.ed that. this does 
not really deppnd on t.he s])f'cific preferE'llcp rplat.ion >- defined in Sectioll :3 . 
The mai n reason for thp propertips t.o hold is our usp of >--dense sets for 
defining t.he 1l0nmonOLonic COIlspquencp relation. This provides use with all 
the properties satisfied by tllP usual preferential approaches. In addition, 
our approach satisfies cau I.ious monot.ollY, and thus cUll1u lati vi ty (wi thoul. 
an addit.ional smoothllps:; condition) because millimal models arp replaced 
by dense sets. 
The properties are usually formula.ted as rules for a IlOIlJl10JIOLOllic COll-
sequence relation f-v. III our context, t.his relation is defiued as follows. 
Definition 5.1 Ass'll17l.e that we !W,'tJf' a fi:u;r/ set V of defwlllt T'ules . FoT' 
closed fonnalr/,(: a, fJ, thf' f·;r:]J1'f:ssion (\' f-v fJ lIu:rms that fJ 1:S a conSf'.fju,(:no: of 
the default theoT'Y (V, {a} ). 
We shall consider the seven properties defined below: 
Right weakening: If (\' -t fJ is valid then, f-v 0' implies, f-v fJ. 
Reflexivity: 0' f-va. 
Right and: (\' f-v fJ and 0' f-v, implies a f-v f3 1\ ,. 
Left or: 0' f-v, aud fJ f-v, implies 0' V fJ f-v,. 
Left logical equivalence: If a f-t fJ is valid then fJ f-v, implies a f-v,. 
Cautious monotony: a f-v fJ and a f-v, implies a 1\ fJ f-v,. 
Rational Ill.Onotony: a f-v fJ and (\' If -', implies a 1\ , f-v fJ · 
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If the first six properties are satisfied then the nonmonotonic consequence 
relation is also cumulative,3 i.e., the first six properties imply the rule 
Cumulativity: If a r- fJ then we have a r-, if, and only if, a /\ fJ r- ,. 
This is a property that is not satisfied for Reiter's approach, even if all 
defaults are closed. 
Theorem 5.2 The nonmonotonic consequence relation defined in Section 3 
satisfies the properties "right weakening," "reflexivity," "right and," "left 
or," "left logical equivalence," and "cautious monotony." It does not satisfy 
"rational monotony. " 
The first property, right weakening, is obvious. In fact, , r- a means that 
there is a dense set A in the set of all models of , such that all elements of 
A satisfy a. Since a ---t fJ is valid, this formula holds in all elements of A. 
Thus fJ also holds in all elements of the dense set A. 
The second property, refle.7:ivity follows from the fact that the set of all 
models of a is dense in itself. 
To show right and, we need the following property of dense sets. 
Lemma 5.3 Let> be (l tr'ansitil1e relation on a set 5, and let A, B be subsets 
of 5. fr A and BaTe >-dense in 5 then so is their inteTsection An B. 
Proof. First, we show that An B is >-complete in 5. Thus assume that 
s E 5. Because A is >-complete there exists a E A such that s 2 a. Now 
completeness of B implies that there is b E B such that (l 2 b. Transitivity 
of > implies s 2 b, and since A is closed we also know b E A. 
Second, An B is obviously >-closed. In fact c E An Band c > d implies 
d E A and dEB since A and Bare >-closed. 0 
Now a r- fJ means that there is a >--dense set A in the set of all models 
of a such that fJ is satisfied in all elements of A. Analogously, a r-, means 
that there is a >--dense set B in the set of all models of a such that , is 
satisfied in all elements of B. But then fJ /\ , is satisfied in all elements of 
An B, and this set is >--dense by the lemma. Thus we have shown that our 
nonmonotonic consequence relation satisfies the "right and" property. 
3See (7), Lemma 19 and 20 for a proof. 
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This property implies that one can only conclude contradictory informa-
tion by default if the precondition is already inconsistent. In fact, assume 
that (3 and I are contradictory, i.e., (3/\, is inconsistent. From a r- (3 and 
a r-, one can conclude a r- (3 t", by "right and." But this means that there 
exists a dense set A in the set 5 of all models of a such that the (inconsistent) 
formula (3/\ I holds in all elements of A. Obviously, this is only possible if A 
is empty. But then 5 mU8t. be empty as well since otherwise the empty set 
A could not be complete in 5 . 
The lejt 01' property iti an easy consequence of the next lemma. 
Lemma 5.4 Lf'l > be a transitive rf'ia/'ion on a SFt 5, and if't 51,52 be 
subsets of 5. fl Al is >-densf' in 5, and A2 is >-r/f'1/,Sr. in 52 then lher'e 
exists a subset B of A, u A2 s'//,ch that B is dr.nSf' in 5, U 5'2' 
Proof. We define B := A; U A~ where the sets A~ ('i = 1,2) are defined 
as 
A~ := Ai \ {a E A, I there is hE 5 j \ Aj (j -=I i) with a > h}. 
First, we show that B is >-complete in 51 U 52. Thus assume that (J, E 
51 U 52. We consider the casp where a E 51. (The other catie is symmetric.) 
Since Al is complete ill 51 there exists all element a1 of A, such that (J, 2 al. 
H 0,1 E A; then we are dOlle. 
Otherwise, there exi8ts h E 52 \ A2 such that a1 > h. Since A2 is complete 
in 52 we know that there is an element h2 of A2 with h ~ h2 . Because> ,s 
transitive we get a > h2 . It remains to be shown that h2 is in A~. 
Assume to the contrary that b2 E A2 \ A;. This means that there exists 
a; E 51 \ Al with b2 > a;. But we know that a1 > b2 > a;, and al E AI . 
Since Al was assumed to be >-closed in 51, we get (J,; E AI, which is in 
contradiction with a; E 51 \ AI' 
Second, If't us prove that B is >-closed in 51 U 52. Thus assume that 
b> a for hE B and a E 51 U 52. We have to show that a E B. We consider 
the case where h E A~, (The case h E A; is symmetric.) Since (J, E 51 U 52 
we have to distingui8h two cases, 
First assume that a E 51. Because Al is >-complete in 51 and bE A; ~ 
AI, b > a implies that (J, E AI. Assume that a rt. A~. But then there exists 
b' E 52 \ A2 such that a > b'. By transitivity of > we get b > b'. This, 
together with 1/ E 52 \ A2 contradicts our assumption that b E A;. 
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Finally, assume that a E 52. We know that a E A2 since otherwise b > a 
would imply that b tj. A~. It remains to be shown that a E A~. Assume to 
the contrary that a E A2 \ A~. This means that there exists b' E 51 \ Al with 
a > b'. But then b > b' and b E Al is in contradiction with our assumption 
that Al is >-closed in 51' 0 
To show the "left or" property, assume that a r--, and (3 r--1. By 51 
we denote the set of all models of a, and by 52 the set of all models of (3. 
Obviously, 51 U 52 is the set of all models of a V (3. 
Now a r--, ((3 r--,) means that there exists a >--dense set Al in 51 (A2 
in 52) such that, holds in all elements of Al (A2)' The lemma yields a 
set B ~ Al U A2 that is >--dense in 51 U 52, the set of all models of a V (3. 
Obviously, , holds in all elements of B. This completes the proof that the 
"left or" property is satisfied by our nonmonotonic consequence relation. 
Left logical equivalence is trivially satisfied. In fact, if a and (3 are logically 
equivalent then they have the same set of models. 
To show Cfl'lltiov,s monotony, we need another simple property of dense 
sets. 
Lemma 5.5 Let> be (J, tnmsiti'/Je relation on (L set 5, anrllet A, B be subsets 
of 5 such that A ~ B. fl A is > -dense in 5 then A is > -dense in B. 
Proof. Assume that A is not >-dense in B. If A is not >-complete in B 
then there is an element b of B such that there does not exist a E A with 
b ~ (J,. Since B ~ 5 this implies that A is not >-complete in 5. 
If A is not >-closed in B then there exists a E A and h E B \ A with 
a > b. Since B ~ 5 we get h E 5 \ A, which shows that A is not >-closed in 
5. 0 
Now assume that a r-- (3 and ()' r-- f. Let 5 be the set of all models of 
a, and let B be the set of all models of a 1\ (3. Now a r--(3 (a r--,) yields a 
>--dense set A1 (A2) in 5 such that fJ (r) holds in all elements of Al (A2)' 
By Lemma ,5.:3 we kuow that A1 n A2 is >--dense in 5. Obviously, a 1\ (3 
holds in all elements of A1 n A2. Thus AJ n A2 ~ B, and by Lemma 5.5 
Al n A2 is dense in B. Since, holds in all elements of AJ n A2, we get 
a 1\ fJ r--,. This completes the proof that "cautions monotony" holds for our 
non monotonic consequence relation. 
The next example demonstrates that mtiorwl monotony is not always 
satisfied (as was to be expected). 
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Example 5.6 We consider the fixed set of defaults V = { : P(x)/P(x)}. 
The closed formulae 0', (3" are defined as 
0' 3 :(;. -,P(x) 
(3 3.7:. (-,P(x) 1\ Vy. (x =1= y -+ P(y))), 
, Vx. -,P(x). 
We have seen in Example 4.4 that (3 is a consequence of the default 
theory (V, {a}). Thus we know that 0' r- (3. In addition, the argument in 
Example 4.4 shows that -', is not a default consequence of (V, {a}), i.e., 
0' lI- -',. In fact, all models of 0' of cardinality 1 must be elements of a 
>--dense set, and in such a model, holds. 
However, fJ is not a consequence of the theory (D, {()' I\,}), i.e., 0' /" r- (3 
does not hold . Obviou:;ly, models of, cannot contain positive examples for 
the default d = : P( :t:)/P( :r:). For this reason we know that the preference 
relation >-d is empty 011 the set of all models of ()' 1\,. This implies that the 
set of all models of 0' 1\ , is tllf' only dense set. But /j does 1I0t hold in all 
models of ()' 1\ ,. 0 
6 Conclusion 
In the approach for handling open normal defaults pn=·sented in t his paper 
the defaults of a given default. t.heory induce a preference relat.ion >- bet.ween 
models of its world description. We have showll by examples t.hat this avoids 
some of the drawbacks of approaches that view open defaults as schemata 
for cert.ain illstantiatiollS. 
Differing from the u:;ual preferential approaches, our 1I0nJl1onotonic COll-
sequence relation is not defined with reference to >--minimal models. Instead 
we have introduced the lIotion of >--dense sets. In Section 5 it was shown 
that, because of this modified preferent.ial approach, our nonmonotonic con-
sequence relation has most. of the "nice" proof-theoretic properties mentiolled 
by Gabbay [5], Makinsoll [9], awl Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [7J. An in-
teresting problem for furt.her research in t.his directioll is to establish an exact 
correspondence bet.ween proof-tIleord,ic properties and om lIew preferential 
approach, similarly to the results of Krau:;, Lehmallll, and Magidor [7J and 
Schlecht a [13J for the usual preferent.ial approaches. 
In the present. paper, we did not take priorities among defaults int.o ac-
count. A possible solution to this problem could be t.o restrict the preference 
relation >-d for a default d in the following way: If <I' is of higher priority than 
d then going from a model A11 to a d-preferred model M2 must not delete 
positive examples or introduce new negative examples for d'. 
In Example 4.1, where we considered contradictory defaults d1 , d2 , this 
approach would solve the conflict if one gives one of the defaults higher 
priority. In fact , one would get the same consequences as if only the default 
with higher priority was present. However, it is a subject of furthe~ research 
to examine this t.reatment of priorities among open defaults more closely. 
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